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Article III, Section 32 of the Pennsylvania
Constitution Requires the General Assembly to
Draft Laws That Promote a Legitimate State
Interest or Public Value, and Any Classification
Must Be Reasonably Related to Accomplishing That
Articulated State Interest or Public Value:
Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission v.
Commonwealth
CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW

-

EQUAL

PROTECTION

-

LABOR

REGULATION - The Pennsylvania Supreme Court found the FirstLevel Supervisor Collective Bargaining Act unconstitutional for
violating the ban on special laws regulating labor in article III,
section 32 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.
Pa. Tpk. Comm'n v. Commonwealth, 899 A.2d 1085 (Pa. 2006).
On November 20, 2001, the Public Employee First-Level Supervisor Collective Bargaining Act (the "Act")1 was proposed in the
Pennsylvania House of Representatives that would have required
collective bargaining between public employers and their firstlevel supervisors. 2 The Act was intended to redefine the relationship between public employers and their first-level supervisors as
set forth by the Public Employee Relations Act ("PERA"). 3 While
PERA permits collective bargaining between public employers and
employees generally, 4 section 1101.704 expressly exempts first6
level supervisors5 from any such requirement.

1.
2.
3.
4.

H.R. 2183, 186th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2002).
Pa. Tpk. Comm'n v. Commonwealth, 899 A.2d 1085, 1087 (Pa. 2006).
43 PA. STAT. ANN. § 1101.101-.2301 (West 2006); Tpk. Cornm'n, 899 A.2d at 1087.
43 PA. STAT. ANN. § 1101.401. PERA defines "public employer' as follows:
"Public employer" means the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, its political subdivisions including school districts and any officer, board, commission, agency,
authority, or other instrumentality thereof and any nonprofit organization or
institution and any charitable, religious, scientific, literary, recreational,
health, educational or welfare institution receiving grants or appropriations
from local, State or Federal governments but shall not include employers covered or presently subject to coverage under the act of June 1, 1937 (P.L. 1168),
as amended, known as the "Pennsylvania Labor Relations Act," [or] the act of
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The original draft of the Act included a "Declaration of Policy" 7
that stated the problem that the Act was intended to rectify.8 The
Act was amended after being referred to the House Labor Relations Committee. 9 The committee replaced the expansive language in the definition of "public employer" with "The Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission" ("the Commission") and changed the
title of the Act to its current title, "First-Level Supervisor Collective Bargaining Act." 10 The "Declaration of Policy" was also removed."l The House of Representatives passed the Act on June
12, 2002, and the Senate passed it on November 26, 2002.12 Pennsylvania Governor Mark Schweiker signed the Act into law on December 9, 2002,13 effective immediately. 14 The Act mandated that

July 5, 1935, Public Law 198, 74th Congress, as amended, known as the "National Labor Relations Act."
Id. § 1101.301(1) (footnotes omitted).
5. PERA defines a "first-level supervisor" as "the lowest level at which an employe
functions as a supervisor." Id. § 1101.301(19). A "supervisor" is defined as:
any individual having authority in the interests of the employer to hire, transfer, suspend, layoff, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward or discipline
other employes or responsibly to direct them or adjust their grievances or to a
substantial degree effectively recommend such action, if in connection with the
foregoing, the exercise of such authority is not merely routine or clerical in nature but calls for the use of independent judgment.
Id. § 1101.301(6).
6. Id. § 1101.704 ("Public employers shall not be required to bargain with units of
first-level supervisors or their representatives, on matters deemed to be bargainable for
other public employes covered by this act."). See Tpk. Comm'n, 899 A.2d at 1087-88.
7. The "Declaration of Policy" used language similar to that included in PERA section
1101.101, except for the inclusion of first-level supervisors. It said:
It is the public policy of this Commonwealth and the purpose of this act to promote orderly, constructive and harmonious relationships between first-level
supervisors and their public employers subject, however, to the paramount
right of the citizens of this Commonwealth to keep inviolate the guarantees for
their health, safety and welfare. Unresolved disputes between public employers and first-level supervisors are injurious to the public and the current meet
and discuss rights of the first-level supervisors provided by [PERA] do not provide a meaningful or enforceable method of resolving disputes. The General
Assembly has determined that the overall policy may best be accomplished by
requiring public employers to negotiate and bargain with employee organizations representing first-level supervisors and to enter into written agreements
evidencing the result of such bargaining.
H.R. 2183, 186th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2002).
8. Tpk. Comm'n, 899 A.2d at 1088.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 1088-89 (citing H.R. 2183, 186th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2002)).
11. Id.
12. Id. at 1089.
13. See 43 PA. STAT. ANN. § 1103.101-.701 (West 2006).
14. Tpk. Comm'n, 899 A.2d at 1089.
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a single public employer, the Commission, must collectively bargain with its supervisors. 15
In January 2003, Ernest Gigliotti, president of the International
Brotherhood of Teamsters, AFL-CIO, Local 30 ("Local 30"), requested on behalf of the Commission's first-level supervisors that
the Commission engage in collective bargaining. 16 The Commission said that it was not required to negotiate with Local 30 until
six months before the start of its fiscal year.17 The Commission
then petitioned for review of the validity of the Act to the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court, 18 arguing that the Act was unconstitutional special legislation in violation of article III, section 3219 of
the Pennsylvania Constitution. 20 Specifically, "the Commission
sought declaratory judgment and injunctive relief to stay implementation of the Act." 21 Separate answers were filed by Local 30,
the Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board, and the Pennsylvania
Office of Attorney General. 22 The Commission filed a motion for
summary judgment, which was granted by a panel of the com24
monwealth court 2 3 in a published opinion.
Judge McGinley wrote the opinion of the commonwealth court. 25
Applying the standard set forth in Curtis v. Kline, 26 the commonwealth court sought to determine if the Act promoted a legitimate
state or public interest, and if so, whether the classification was
reasonably related to accomplishing that interest. 27 The Commis15. The statute reads, "[i]t shall be the duty of the public employer and employee organizations representing first-level supervisors to settle all disputes by engaging in collective bargaining in good faith and by entering into settlements by way of written agreements and maintaining of the same." 43 PA. STAT. ANN. § 1103.301. The Act's definitions
of first-level supervisor and supervisor are materially identical to the definitions of those
terms contained in PERA. Tpk. Comm'n, 899 A.2d at 1089. See supra note 5.
16. Tpk. Comm'n, 899 A.2d at 1089.
17. Id. The Act provides that "[clollective bargaining shall begin at least six months
before the start of the fiscal year of the public employer." 43 PA. STAT. ANN. § 1103.302.
18. Tpk. Comm'n, 899 A.2d at 1089.
19. In pertinent part, the Pennsylvania Constitution provides:
The General Assembly shall pass no local or special law in any case which has
been or can be provided for by general law and specifically the General Assembly shall not pass any local or special law:
7. Regulating labor, trade, mining or manufacturing.
PA. CONST. art. III, § 32(7).
20. Tpk. Comm'n, 899 A.2d at 1089-90.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 1090.
23. Pa. Tpk. Comm'n v. Commonwealth, 855 A.2d 923 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2004).
24. Tpk. Corm'n, 899 A.2d at 1090.
25. Pa. Tpk., 855 A.2d at 924.
26. 666 A.2d 265, 267-68 (Pa. 1995).
27. Pa. Tpk., 855 A.2d at 926 (citing Curtis, 666 A.2d at 269).
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sion conceded that the Act likely promoted a legitimate state interest or public value because its implementation would give rise
to meaningful labor relations. 28 However, the crux of the Commission's dispute was that these policy arguments apply to any
public employer, not just the Commission. 29 The Commission also
argued that the legislation was per se unconstitutional because it
created a class of one. 30 The commonwealth court agreed with the
Commission, saying there is no rational reason to treat first-level
supervisors employed by the Commission differently than those
employed by any other public employer. 31 Accordingly, the court
granted the Commission's motion for summary judgment 32 without addressing the Commission's contention that the Act was per
33
se unconstitutional.
Local 30 asserted four arguments on appeal. 34 First, it contended that the Commission did not meet its burden to demonstrate unconstitutionality. 35 Second, Local 30 claimed that the
Commission was a unique class of one, making it appropriate for
experimentation with an alternative to PERA. 36 Third, the General Assembly had afforded other publicly employed, first-level
supervisors the right to collectively bargain. 37 Finally, Local 30
claimed that there was no such thing as a per se unconstitutional

statute. 38
The Commission made several arguments in response. 39 It contended that the Act was a classic example of an unconstitutional
special law40 and that the Commission's disparate treatment was
not rationally related to the Act's purpose. 41 Additionally, the
Commission claimed that it did not warrant disparate treatment
regarding labor relations. 42 Finally, the Commission claimed that
there was no evidence showing that the Act was part of a pilot
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 927.
32. Pa.Tpk., 855 A.2d at 927.
33. Id. at 927 n.9.
34. Pa. Tpk. Comm'n v. Commonwealth, 899 A.2d 1085, 1091 (Pa. 2006).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 1091-92.
39. Tpk. Comm'n, 899 A.2d at 1092.
40. A special law is one which either has a closed class of one or classifies in an unnecessarily restrictive way. Chalmers v. City of Philadelphia, 95 A. 427 (Pa. 1915).
41. T)k. Comm'n, 899 A.2d at 1092.
42. Id.
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program or, alternatively, it argued that the Act was unconstitu43
tional per se.
Justice Castille delivered the opinion for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. 44 After recognizing that a challenge to the constitutionality of a statute requires plenary, non-deferential review, 45 he
explained that the Commission faced a heavy burden of persuasion,46 insofar as legislation passed by the General Assembly is
presumed to be valid and constitutional. 47 The court analogized
the constitutional provision at issue to the federal principles of
equal protection under the law, 48 recognizing that the same analysis was required. 49 However, Justice Castille highlighted the Legislature's ability to classify different entities in spite of equal protection, as long as the classification is for the purpose of the
health, safety and welfare of the community. 50 After analyzing
the "Declaration of Policy" from the original version of the Act, the
court was unable to determine how the Act would prevent injury
to the public. 5 1 In fact, Justice Castille noted that PERA did not
allow first-level supervisors to strike and, even if it did, first-level
supervisors do not collect the tolls or maintain the roads and are
thus not necessary for the public to be able to drive on the Penn52
sylvania Turnpike.
The court was equally dismissive of Local 30's other arguments. 5 3 Justice Castille noted that it was possible that the Act
was part of an incremental approach to correct problems of Commonwealth-wide concern. 54 While the General Assembly was permitted to take this approach, it could not do so by creating special
legislation in violation of the Pennsylvania Constitution. 55 Also,
while the Legislature had passed other laws that dealt with other
43. Id. at 1092-93.
44. Id. at 1086. Justices Newman, Saylor, Eakin, Baer, and Baldwin joined in the
majority opinioned authored by Chief Justice Cappy. Id.
45. See Harrisburg Sch. Dist. v. Zogby, 828 A.2d 1079, 1087-88 (Pa. 2003).
46. Tpk. Comm'n, 899 A.2d at 1094 (citing Zogby, 828 A.2d at 1087-88).
47. Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Mockaitis, 834 A.2d 488, 497 (Pa. 2003)).
48. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall ... deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.").
49. Tpk. Comm'n, 899 A.2d at 1094.
50. Id. (citing Zogby, 828 A.2d at 1088) (stating that principles of equal protection do
not "prohibit differential treatment of persons having different needs").
51. Id. at 1095-96.
52. Id. at 1096.
53. Id.
54. Tpk. Comm'n, 899 A.2d at 1097.
55. Id.
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employers and purported to have the same effect as the Act, 56
these laws were distinguishable and had not yet been challenged
in the court. 57 Justice Castille concluded this portion of the opinion by making the assumption that there may be a legitimate
state interest behind the Act.5 8 However, with no distinctions between the first-level supervisors of the Commission and other publicly employed first-level supervisors, the Act did not pass consti59
tutional muster.
In the alternative, the court addressed the issue of per se unconstitutionality. 60 After discussing the background of the argument, 61 Justice Castille concluded that previous mentions of a per
se unconstitutional standard were not dicta. 62 The court noted,
"where a decision rests on two or more grounds equally valid,
none
may be relegated to the inferior status of obiter dictum." 63 Because the Act applied only to the Commission, the court noted this
was a clear example of a class of one, concluding that the Act was
64
per se unconstitutional.
Justice Saylor had previously noted that, "[i]n the seven years
before the Constitution of 1874 was adopted, the General Assembly enacted 8755 local or special acts and only 475 general laws." 6 5
These local or special acts were seen as prejudicial to similarly
situated people or locations as compared to those who benefited
from the local laws. 66 With this background in mind, article III,
56. The Port Authority Act, 55 PA. STAT. ANN. section 563.2 (West 2006), applies to
first-level supervisors of port authorities of counties of the second class. Tpk. Comm'n, 899
A.2d at 1097 n.17. The School Administrators Act, 71 PA. STAT. ANN. section 371 (West
2006), applies to first-level supervisors in school districts in counties of the second class.
Tpk. Comm'n, 899 A.2d at 1097 n.17. While Allegheny County is the only second-class
county and Philadelphia County is the only first-class county in Pennsylvania, they may be
joined by others as population increases. Id. at 1097.
57. Tpk. Comm'n, 899 A.2d at 1097 n. 17.
58. Id. at 1097.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. See Wheeler v. City of Philadelphia, 77 Pa. 338 (1875) (upholding the Act of May 23,
1874, which divided Pennsylvania cities into three classes for municipal government legislation). See also Haverford Twp. v. Siegle, 28 A.2d 786, 789 (Pa. 1942) ("[The fact that
Philadelphia was the only member of a class did not make the act local, since it provided for
a class as such, into which other members might come.").
62. Tpk. Comm'n, 899 A.2d at 1097-98 (citing Wheeler, 77 Pa. at 338; Haverford, 28
A.2d 786, 789).
63. Id. at 1098 (citing Commonwealth ex rel. Fox v. Swing, 186 A.2d 24, 26 (Pa. 1962)).
"Obiter dictum" is a comment made in an opinion "unnecessary to the decision in the case
and therefore not precedential." BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 490 (8th ed. 2004).
64. Tpk. Comm'n, 899 A.2d at 1098.
65. Harrisburgh Sch. Dist. v. Zogby, 828 A.2d 1079, 1088 (Pa. 2003) (citing ROBERT E.
WOODSIDE, PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 321 (Murrelle Print Co. 1985)).
66. Zogby, 282 A.2d at 1088.
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section 32 was not added to the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1874
to prohibit the General Assembly from enacting limited measures
as part of a series of legislation intended to improve similarly
situated people or locations. 67 Rather, the entire purpose of adding the ban on special legislation was to end the pervasive favoritism that existed in the General Assembly. 68 There was no fear of
excess legislation. 69 Simply stated, if there is a situation worthy
of legislation, such legislation should be general and apply, with70
out distinction, to all similarly situated individuals or locations.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has expressly distinguished
general and special legislation. 71 In the broadest sense, a law is
general where it affects every person who is brought within the
relations and circumstances provided for in that law. 72 More specifically, a law is general when it is based on a valid legislative
classification. 73 The classification may not be arbitrary or enacted
74
solely for the purpose of evading constitutional requirements.
Moreover, there must be a valid state interest in creating the classification. 75 On the other hand, if there is a closed class of one, the
law is special. 76 Where a classification is unnecessarily restrictive
or improperly selected, the law is special, even though the subject
77
of the legislation demands separate laws for separate classes.
Article III, section 32 was first interpreted by the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court in Wheeler v. City of Philadelphia.78 There, the
court held that even though Philadelphia was in a class of one, the
class was not closed, which made the classification valid. 79 This
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Pa. Co. for Ins. on Lives and Granting Annuities v. Scott, 198 A. 115, 117 (Pa. 1938)
(finding an act controlling the payment of debts unconstitutional as special legislation).
70. Id.
71. See Harrisburg Sch. Dist. v. Hickok, 761 A.2d 1132, 1136 (Pa. 2000); see also Perkins v. City of Philadelphia, 27 A. 356, 359 (Pa. 1893).
72. Evans v. Witmer, 2 Pa. C. 612 (Pa. Ct. Com. P1. 1887), aff'd, 11 A. 630 (Pa. 1887).
73. Hickok, 761 A.2d at 1136.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Perkins, 27 A. at 359.
77. Chalmers v. City of Philadelphia, 95 A. 427, 428 (Pa. 1915).
78. 77 Pa. 338 (Pa. 1875). The Legislature had just classified cities for the first time
based on population, and Philadelphia was the only city of the first class. Wheeler, 77 Pa.
at 338. Originally found in article III, section 7 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, Pennsylvania's prohibition of special and local laws was renumbered to article III, section 32 on
May 16, 1967. See Donald Marritz, Comment, Making Equality Matter (Again): The Prohibition Against Special Laws in the Pennsylvania Constitution, 3 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 161,
167 (1993).
79. Wheeler, 77 Pa. at 342 (holding a class of one is not necessarily unconstitutional if
the class is open to other members).
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rule was elaborated on by the court in Haverford Township v.
Siegle.8 0 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the General
Assembly had the right to exclude members of a class from legislation when the law would be of no use to the excluded members.8 1
In Freezer Storage, Inc. v. Armstrong Cork Co., the Pennsylvania Supreme Court set forth the standard of review that is
proper when a statute is challenged under article III, section 32.82
Courts may rely not only on stated bases for classifications, but
may also consider any hypothetical reason that can serve to verify
the constitutionality of the classification. 8 3 The court entertained
several valid reasons for the classification and upheld the statute.8 4 When a basis for the classifications is sought, the actual
intent of the Legislature is irrelevant.8 5 As long as the court can
hypothesize a rational basis for the distinctions, the classification
is valid.86 The court's conclusion in Freezer Storage was based on
several cases which did, in fact, find that the General Assembly
had valid reasons to classify people, businesses, and municipalities because of reasons the court thought of sua sponte. 87 The
80. 28 A.2d 786 (Pa. 1942). The statute at issue in Haverford imposed regulations on
police barracks in townships of a certain population that employed more than three police
officers. Haverford, 28 A.2d at 787. The Township argued that classifications must be
based on population because article III, section 34 of the Pennsylvania Constitution permitted the Legislature to classify according to population. Id. The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court held that expressly granting one type of classification did not exclude others. Id. at
790.
81. Haverford, 28 A.2d at 786. The court found that "[a] township having one or two or
no police officers would be justified in objecting strenuously to the expense and inconvenience of maintaining a complete system of police civil service which would have no function
to perform." Id. at 788. The exclusion was found to be reasonable and necessary. Id.
82. Freezer Storage, Inc. v. Armstrong Cork Co., 382 A.2d 715, 718 (Pa. 1978). The
statute at issue in Freezer Storage created a distinction between engineers, architects,
builders and others involved with land improvement, to which the statute did not apply.
Freezer Storage, 382 A.2d at 718. The statute limited liability for injuries attributable to
builders to twelve years after completion of the project. Id.
83. Freezer Storage, 382 A.2d at 718.
84. Id. Builders differ in insurance pricing and structure, have no control over maintenance and may be liable under more theories than other parties involved in a land improvement project. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 719. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court allowed a classification of open-pit
coal mining because of higher environmental risks than other types of mining. DuFour v.
Maize, 56 A.2d 675 (Pa. 1948). A state agency was permitted to withhold loans from nursing homes that did not reach certain safety standards because the court found the Legislature would want to promote higher safety standards. Tosto v. Pa. Nursing Home Loan
Agency, 331 A.2d 198 (Pa. 1975). The court upheld a tax on domestic life insurance companies, which did not apply to domestic casualty insurance companies, because it hypothesized the tax could be rationally based on the different characteristics of the two types of
insurance. Commonwealth v. Life Assurance Co., 214 A.2d 209 (Pa. 1965).
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Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded that, once a distinction is
found to be valid, a reviewing court has no further discretion to
88
examine the judgment of the General Assembly.
In 1992, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reconsidered whether
legislation that created a class of one should be struck down as
unconstitutional in Harristown Development Corp. v. Department
of General Services.8 9 The Right to Know Act and the Sunshine
Act purported to require any nonprofit corporation that collected
over $1,500,000 in rental income from the Commonwealth to make
records and meetings of covered agencies public to all citizens of
Pennsylvania. 9° Harristown was the only nonprofit corporation
collecting over $1,500,000 from the Commonwealth when it filed
the suit, and it therefore claimed Act 153 was in violation of article III, section 32 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. 9 1 In its decision, the court reiterated the Pennsylvania standard that "a classification of one member is not unconstitutional so long as other
members might come into that class. '' 92 Concerning the requirement that there be a rational basis for classification, the court hypothesized that keeping track of the activities of corporations that
supply that level of rental space to the Commonwealth is a very
important interest and could serve as a rational basis for the classification. 93 Because it was possible for another nonprofit corporation to join the class and there was a legitimate Commonwealth
94
interest in creating the classification, the statute was upheld.
Even though the Act was written with Harristown in mind, the
95
class was not intrinsically closed.
Eight years after Harristown, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
held a law concerning civil servant promotions to be in violation of
96
article III, section 32 in DeFazio v. Civil Service Commission.
88. Freezer Storage, 382 A.2d at 721.
89. 614 A.2d 1128, 1132 (Pa. 1992).
90. Harristown,614 A.2d at 1129. See Right to Know Act, 65 PA. CONS. STAT. § 66.1-.4
(2006); Sunshine Act, 65 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 271-286 (2006).
91. Harristown,614 A.2d at 1131.
92. Id. at 1132 n.9.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 1129.
95. Id.
96. 756 A.2d 1103 (Pa. 2000). The Act in question provided:
Whenever a vacancy is likely to occur or is to be filled in a permanent position
in the office of sheriff, the sheriff shall submit to the civil service commission a
statement indicating the position to be filled. The civil service commission shall
thereupon certify to the sheriff the names of the three eligibles willing to accept
appointment who are highest, according to the results of the written examination, on the appropriate promotion list or employment list, whichever is in exis-
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This Act applied only to sheriffs in counties of the second class, of
which Allegheny County is the only county. 97 "Sheriffs of second
class counties" was a new classification. 98 Allegheny County Sheriff DeFazio sought to enjoin the county from enforcing the hiring
policies and limits on political activities. 99 The attorney general
argued that the Act was constitutional because of the unique
characteristics of the Allegheny County Sheriffs Office.10 0 While
recognizing the General Assembly's ability to differentiate among
the counties of the Commonwealth, the court stated that "[p]lainly
such a subclassification bears no relationship either to the distinction of Allegheny County as a county of the second class or any
unique function of the office of county sheriff."'1 1 The Allegheny
County Sheriff became the only county official in Pennsylvania
lacking discretion to hire, promote or terminate his employees. 102
Because the court could not discern any rational reason for this
0 3
differential treatment, the Act was held unconstitutional.
Later in 2000, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court validated a
statute that implicated article III, section 32 in HarrisburgSchool
District v. Hickok. 10 4 The court, following DeFazio, recognized
that the General Assembly may create classifications when "those
classifications are reasonable rather than arbitrary and bear a
reasonable relationship to the object of legislation."' 1 5 The Act in
question was then ruled unconstitutional, because there was no
tence. If there are less than three eligibles on appropriate eligible lists who are
willing to accept appointment, the civil service commission shall certify all the
names on these lists. If upon inquiry by the civil service commission, any person on any promotion or employment list is found to be not available for promotion or appointment, the person's name shall not for the time being be considered among the names from which a promotion or appointment is to be made.
Act of Jan. 27, 1998, No. 1998-1, § 1, 1998 Pa. Laws 1, 16 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4216(b) (1998),
invalidated by DeFazio, 756 A.2d at 1106. Additionally, "[n]o employee shall use his official
authority or influence for the purpose of interfering with or affecting the result of an election." Id. § 4217(a).
97. DeFazio, 756 A.2d at 1106.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. DeFazio,756 A.2d at 1106.
103. Id.
104. 761 A.2d 1132 (Pa. 2000). The statute provided that "a school district of the second
class with a history of low test performance which is coterminous with the city of the third
class which contains the permanent seat of government" may be put under the control of
the mayor. Education Empowerment Act of 2000, No. 2000-16, § 8.1, 2000 Pa. Laws 44, 50,
24 PA. CONS. STAT. § 17-1707-B (2000), invalidated by Hickok, 761 A.2d 1132. Of course,
Harrisburg is the only city of the third class which contains the permanent seat of government. Hickok, 761 A.2d at 1135.
105. Hickok, 761 A.2d at 1136 n.2.
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rational basis for treating the students of the Harrisburg School
District differently than other students in similarly failing educational systems.10 6 Despite this holding, the General Assembly was
1 07
determined to improve the failing Harrisburg School District.
Therefore, the Act in question in Hickok was amended.10 8 The
new class still had only four members: Harrisburg, Allentown,
Erie and Reading. 10 9 The commonwealth court declared the
amendment unconstitutional for the same reasons as the original
version.110 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed, holding
that the new classification was "reasonably related to the Commonwealth's legitimate interest in, and the General Assembly's
constitutional duty to ensure, the existence of a thorough and efficient system of public education.""'
While it is very unlikely that the outcomes of any of these cases
would be different today than they were when they were decided,
the method of deciding them has evolved since the language of
article III, section 32 was first added to the Pennsylvania Constitution. The original test was simply whether the act in question
had a classification that was open to more than one member and
more than one location in the Commonwealth. 112 The courts later
explained that people and locations may be excluded from valid
classifications if the legislation and policy to be furthered by the
1 13
restriction do not apply to those potential class members.
Nearly a century after the appearance of article III, section 32,
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court expanded its method of deciding
the constitutionality of acts challenged under it. 1 14 When a basis
for classifications in an act of the General Assembly is sought,
courts are free to supply their own rationale behind the legislation, and the actual subjective intent of the General Assembly is
irrelevant. 115 If the Legislature creates a class that is forever limited to one member, it is per se unconstitutional. 116 Finally, if the
106. Id. at 1136.
107. Harrisburgh Sch. Dist. v. Zogby, 828 A.2d 1079, 1083 (Pa. 2003).
108. Zogby, 828 A.2d at 1083. The statute now applies to schools with "a history of extraordinarily low test performance which is coterminous with a city of the third class that
has opted under the 'Optional Third Class City Charter Law' or 53 Pa.C.S. Pt. III Subpt.
E." 24 PA. CONS. STAT. § 17-1707-B.
109. Zogby, 828 A.2d at 1084.
110. Id. at 1086.
111. Id. at 1091.
112. Wheeler v. City of Philadelphia, 77 Pa. 338, 342 (1875).
113. Haverford Twp. v. Siegle, 28 A.2d 786 (Pa. 1942).
114. Freezer Storage, Inc. v. Armstrong Cork Co., 382 A.2d 715, 718 (Pa. 1978).
115. Freezer Storage, 382 A.2d at 718.
116. Harristown Dev. Corp. v. Dep't. of Gen. Servs., 614 A.2d 1128, 1132 n.9 (Pa. 1992).
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classification has no relationship to the policy sought to be furthered by legislation, the act will be held unconstitutional. 117
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court consistently applied all of
these principles in Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission v. Commonwealth. 118 The class had only one member, the Pennsylvania
Turnpike Commission. 119 A reading of Wheeler 120 and Haverford121 would support declaring the Act unconstitutional special
legislation as soon as this determination is made, so long as there
is a base understanding that the Commonwealth would benefit
from constructive labor relations between all public employers and
their first-level supervisors.
However, this factor alone is not sufficient to declare an act of
the General Assembly unconstitutional under article III, section
32. When the classification includes the Pennsylvania Turnpike
Commission and excludes everyone else, the court should, as it did
in the instant case, analyze whether or not the policy and the
method of enforcing the act apply to the excluded class.122 When
making this determination, the court used the original "Declaration of Policy" that accompanied the Act. 123 The court could have
hypothesized any valid policy reason behind the Act pursuant to
Freezer Storage,124 but it was unable to discern any ,valid reason
not stated in the original "Declaration of Policy."'1 25 While the Act
stated that the overall policy of the Commonwealth was to promote harmony in the labor relationship between first-level supervisors and their public employers, perhaps the General Assembly
intended to promote a slightly different policy by the time the final
version of the Act became law.
A plain language reading of the Act confirms the idea that the
policy championed by the Legislature was to promote harmony in
the labor relations between the Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission and all of its employees. 126 Additionally, the Commonwealth
surely would wish to support avoiding a shutdown of the operations of the Pennsylvania Turnpike. Arguing such a policy would
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be futile in most courts, but, as the court correctly concluded, it is
not the policy alone that determines whether legislation will be
held constitutional when challenged under article III, section
32.127 Even if a valid policy failed to be fulfilled in this case, the
public at large would not be harmed. As the court correctly noted,
a failure in labor relations between the Turnpike Commission and
its first-level supervisors would probably never be noticed by the
public. 128 First-level supervisors oversee toll collectors and maintenance crews, but do not themselves collect tolls or maintain
roads. Meaningful labor relations and continuance of normal
turnpike operations are important, but the Act does not rationally
support these policies. Even if the court did not look at the Act as
broadly as it could have, its conclusion that the Act constituted
unconstitutional special legislation was correct. Although the labor relationship between the Commission and its first-level supervisors would be more fair for both sides, there is no reason the
same policy should not apply to all public employers. It is this
distinction that would invalidate the Act even if it was rationally
tied to a policy that promoted a legitimate state or public interest.
Ruling that the Act was unconstitutional, however, failed to ensure that first-level supervisors of the Turnpike Commission, or of
any public employer, will have more constructive labor relationships with their employers. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
made it clear that any attempt to benefit only one public employer
will fail, absent a compelling argument in support of the benefit to
the Commonwealth. 129 Part of the Commonwealth's argument in
defense of the Act was that the Turnpike Commission was to be
used as a pilot program to determine if the Act would be useful for
other public employers. 130 The General Assembly is permitted to
attempt such a program, and perhaps this is the means by which
the Legislature will achieve its goal of meaningful and constructive labor relations between public employers and their first-level
supervisors. However, Justice Castille noted that any incremental
approach may constitute special legislation. 11
In order to achieve its goal, the most efficacious approach for the
General Assembly would be to pass the Act as it was originally
drafted, applying it to all public employers and their first-level
127.
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supervisors. In doing so, the Legislature could avoid all of the
problems that could cause a law to be determined special. Applying a law to every similarly situated public employer would create
the exact situation the Framers of the Pennsylvania Constitution
imagined when they required that every law be generally applied
across the Commonwealth.
Jeffrey Hantz

